South Sudan

Broad in Participation, Uneven in Power: Actor Dynamics in South Sudan’s Fragile Peace Process

Authors: Leah Rose, Zoe Gudino, Nicholas de Carvalho

Visualisations: Samvit Nagpal

Introduction

Overview of Conflict

South Sudan became the world’s youngest nation in 2011 following a decades-old war against Sudan; however, when President Kiir removed Vice President Riek Machar from office in 2013 a civil war broke out. Riek Machar has led the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO), a largely Nuer rebel group against Kiir’s largely Dinka government (Noel and de Waal 2016). The war has been largely fought along ethnic lines for control over the natural resources and political power of the country. By 2018, over 400,000 people died and over a million refugees left the country (Mandil and Winter 2025). Third parties have tried to mediate the conflict. The 2015 Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) mediated peace deal quickly collapsed however. In 2018, a peace deal mediated by Uganda and Sudan resulted in the 2018 Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) power-sharing agreement (see PA-X Peace Agreements Database, n.d.); however, in 2025 a Nuer militia group called the White Army attacked government military bases leading to the arrest of Riek Machar by Salva Kiir, ending this past time of relative quiet (Security Council Report 2025). 

Contemporary Developments in South Sudan as explored through a poster

Building on this background of repeated conflict and fragile agreements, recent developments in South Sudan illustrate how these dynamics have persisted rather than fundamentally changed. In the years following the R-ARCSS, the peace process has continued to evolve through a series of overlapping mediation efforts and ongoing political disputes, alongside broader attempts to stabilise a fragile post-conflict order. Although the agreement formally ended the civil war, its implementation has remained uneven. Periods of cooperation have been undermined by recurring mistrust between signatory parties, while significant armed opposition groups remain outside the framework, limiting its overall reach (Gatwech, 2025). In this context, regional and international actors have repeatedly intervened to reopen dialogue and prevent a return to large-scale conflict. 

The Tumaini (“Hope”) Initiative, led by Kenya, has sought to create an additional diplomatic channel for engaging non-signatory opposition groups outside the 2018 framework. Rather than replacing the existing peace agreement, it functions as a supplementary track aimed at drawing fragmented armed actors back into political dialogue. While it has helped to re-establish communication with some groups, evidencing continued regional commitment to mediation, it has also highlighted the difficulties of negotiating with highly divided opposition movements and the limited incentives available to fundamentally alter entrenched political dynamics (Akuocpiir, 2024; Manyang, 2025; Magara and Pospisil, 2024; Wol, 2024). 

A different form of engagement is reflected in the African Union’s (AU) Panel of the Wise, which operates as a high-level advisory mediation mechanism. Its role has largely focused on sustaining political dialogue during periods of deadlock and encouraging elite-level commitment to the peace process. However, its influence depends heavily on persuasion rather than enforcement, meaning its capacity to shape outcomes is constrained when domestic actors are unwilling to implement agreed measures or when political calculations outweigh mediation pressures (African Union, 2025; AmaniAfrica, 2025; Nantulya, 2016). 

At the same time, the 2025 arrest and legal proceedings involving Vice President Riek Machar have raised questions over whether justice processes strengthen or destabilise fragile peace settlements. It can be argued that Machar’s arrest represents an effort to strengthen accountability and rule of law; however, it also creates a potential source of renewed political fragmentation within an already fragile power-sharing arrangement (Mureithi, 2025; Winter and Mandil, 2025). 

Taken together, these developments demonstrate the continued presence of active mediation and political contestation in South Sudan, as well as the limits of external and regional initiatives in producing durable settlement outcomes. This set of cases formed the basis of our previous semester’s final project, a poster which examined how mediation functions in practice and why the gap between formal agreements and political realities remains so persistent. 

Poster

Important Actors and Project Aims

ThThe conflict and peace process in South Sudan is shaped by a complex set of actors. At its core are the main conflict parties: the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), led by Salva Kiir, and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO), led by Riek Machar. Alongside them, other armed groups with shifting alliances have played important roles. During the revitalised peace process, several opposition groups formed the South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA). While some signed the 2018 agreement, those that did not formed the South Sudan National Democratic Alliance (SSNDA) under Lt. Gen. Thomas Cirillo Swaka. The most prominent of these non-signatory groups is the National Salvation Front (NAS) (McCallum , Cohen and Awate, 2023). 

Beyond the belligerents, third-party actors play a key role. These include regional and international organisations such as IGAD, the AU, and the United Nations, including missions such as the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). International actors such as Troika (US, UK, Norway) are also involved, alongside neighbouring countries including Uganda, Sudan, Kenya, South Africa and Ethiopia. At the same time, a broader set of actors operate within and around the peace process, including civil society organisations, women’s groups, and religious leaders. While less consistently present in formal negotiations, they remain important in shaping dialogue, trust, and local engagement.  

(Please explore our interactive visualisation showcasing interactions between third-party mediators in South Sudan at the bottom of this report) 

This project builds on this diversity by examining how different types of actors operate within the peace process. Using our dataset, we map relationships between actors through an actor network to explore how they interact, where they are positioned, and how their roles differ in practice. This visualisation highlights which actors occupy more central, highly connected positions and which remain more peripheral, offering insight into how influence and participation are distributed across the South Sudan peace process. Building on this, we focus in depth on three actors who represent distinct positions within this landscape: 

1. Women’s groups: occupy a position between formal and informal parts of the peace process. While actively engaged in peacebuilding, particularly at the community level, they are not consistently included in formal negotiations. This makes them a useful case for understanding how inclusion works in practice, and the challenges some actors face in trying to move from participation into real influence. 

2. The Community of Sant’Egidio: occupy a uniquely informal and faith-based space in the mediation landscape of the South Sudan conflict. As a Catholic lay network operating outside both state power and formal intergovernmental organisations, it is able to access armed groups and sustain dialogue in ways unavailable to more formal actors, while also revealing the limitations associated with a lack of political leverage and enforcement capacity. 

3. National Salvation Front (NAS): occupy an important position as one of the largest belligerents refusing to enter peace talks. NAS refused to participate in the 2018 R-ARCSS, and in the Tumaini Initiative. The leader, Thomas Cirillo has consistently criticized peace efforts as simply strengthening the tribalism and power in Juba, instead arguing for increased federalism. As the largest non-signatory group, a study of NAS presents an opportunity to analyse why peace negotiations have not been able to unite all actors to pursue peace. 

The identification of these actors, and their positioning within the peace process, draws on our analysis of the MEND data (2025), which captures mediation events and actor participation, enabling us to examine patterns of centrality, influence, and exclusion. Ultimately, these cases and the actor network showcase the diversity of local and international actors, formal and informal roles, and ways to approach peacebuilding. The project’s goal is to demonstrate how the peace process is shaped not only by major political actors, but also by a larger network of individuals who operate in various ways and at different levels. 

Women Actors in South Sudan

Why Women Matter in Peace Processes

Excluding women from peace processes does not just produce inequality, but fundamentally weakens peace itself. This recognition has been established at the international level, most notably through UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000). Resolution 1325 provided a legal and political framework for women’s participation in peace negotiations, humanitarian action, and governance (Sabala, 2017). It signified a move away from perceiving women primarily as victims of conflict and toward seeing them as key agents for conflict resolution (O’Reilly and OSúilleabháin, 2013). 

Despite this, a gap remains between recognition and implementation. Women are still underrepresented in formal peace processes: between 1992 and 2011, they made up only 9% of negotiating delegations, 4% of signatories, and 2.4% of chief mediators. At the same time, women are often active in community-level mediation and informal peace efforts (O’Reilly and OSúilleabháin, 2013), yet these contributions are under-recognised and poorly connected to formal processes (Sabala, 2017). This reflects a lack of political will (Mayen, 2013), and the structure of peace processes, which prioritise belligerents and elite bargaining (McCallum , Cohen and Awate, 2023). 

This exclusion affects both representation and outcomes. Research shows that women’s participation contributes to more comprehensive and durable peace agreements, increasing legitimacy, public buy-in, and attention to the underlying drivers of conflict (O’Reilly and OSúilleabháin, 2013). In contrast, exclusionary processes risk producing narrow settlements that fail to reflect the needs of the affected population and are more likely to break down over time (Mayen, 2013). Women’s inclusion should therefore be understood as fundamental to sustainable peace, both as a matter of equality and as a means of broadening the scope of peace processes. 

The case of South Sudan

This gap between recognition and meaningful inclusion is particularly evident in South Sudan, where women’s contributions to peacebuilding have been significant yet constrained within formal processes. Women and girls have been disproportionately affected by the conflict, facing high levels of insecurity and sexual and gender-based violence (Kezie-Nwoha and Were, 2018), but they are rarely recognised as peacebuilding actors (Search for Common Ground, 2021). Nevertheless, South Sudanese women have long played central roles in community-level responses, building alliances and engaging in mediation (Mayen, 2013). This highlights a disconnect between women’s active role in peacebuilding and their marginal position in formal processes. Analysing successive peace processes therefore reveals how participation has evolved and whether it has translated into meaningful influence. 

The 2015 ARCSS marked the first major attempt to formally end the conflict. Mediation in Addis Ababa under IGAD was dominated by political and military actors (Sabala, 2017), with women making up only 15% of negotiators (Kezie-Nwoha and Were, 2018). Although women pushed for recognition and contributed to some provisions (see PA-X Peace Agreements Database, n.d.), their involvement was largely confined to lower-level roles, excluded from pre-negotiation stages and limited to consultation spaces. As a result, their influence remained minimal and only shallowly reflected in the agreement (Sabala, 2017). 

The 2018 R-ARCSS signalled a shift toward greater inclusion. Women made up 25% of delegates, one female mediator was appointed, the South Sudan Women Coalition participated as delegates, observers, and signatories (Kezie-Nwoha and Were, 2018), and the agreement introduced a 35% quota for women’s representation (see PA-X Peace Agreements Database, n.d.). Women also continued to play key roles in grassroots peacebuilding (Poppelreuter, 2023). The R-ARCSS period therefore reflects expanded formal inclusion alongside the continued importance of community-level contributions. 

Despite this, peace in South Sudan remains fragile, with ongoing violence and non-signatory armed groups. The 2020 Rome Process, aimed at bringing these groups into the peace framework, was not designed as an inclusive process but focused on negotiations between government and armed actors. Women and civil society were largely absent from the negotiation table, reinforced by the location of talks in Rome. This highlights how gains in women’s participation remain fragile and dependent on sustained pressure (McCallum , Cohen and Awate, 2023). 

Women Groups in MEND

Recently, in September 2025, the Community Empowerment for Progress Organization (CEPO), in partnership with UN Women, launched the Women Action for Peace Dialogue (WAPD) initiative (CEPO, 2025). The programme trained 21 women mediators to support dialogue around the R-ARCSS transition and ongoing inter-communal violence. They facilitated inter-party discussions, helping to renew engagement between political actors and build consensus ahead of a high-level dialogue held from 15–19 December 2025. This work highlights how women’s involvement in mediation can build trust and advance political processes. The initiative also reflects strong international backing, including support from Norway, the European Union, and the United Kingdom (United Nations, 2025). As one example from our dataset, this shows what meaningful inclusion can achieve. However, it sits alongside a wider range of equally important, though less visible, efforts. 

Looking Forward – Challenges and Recommendations

Despite growing recognition of women’s roles in peacebuilding, significant barriers continue to limit their meaningful participation in South Sudan. At a societal level, patriarchal norms and cultural expectations restrict women’s participation (Poppelreuter, 2023). In some areas, girls’ education remains taboo, contributing to high illiteracy and limiting political engagement (Morgan, 2024). Even where women are present, participation does not necessarily translate into influence. Women delegates often face restrictive mediation structures, harassment and exclusion from decision-making spaces (Poppelreuter, 2023). 

Structural barriers further reinforce this marginalisation. A lack of political will remains a central issue, with commitments such as the 35% quota under the R-ARCSS largely unimplemented. Weak institutional mechanisms and limited accountability mean that progress is not effectively monitored or enforced (McCallum , Cohen and Awate, 2023). In addition, divisions within women’s movements, as well as a disconnect between women in political office and those at grassroots level, weaken collective influence (Poppelreuter, 2023). The broader conflict environment also constrains participation. South Sudan remains highly militarised (Sabala, 2017), with ongoing insecurity and a shrinking civic space (Poppelreuter, 2023). Finally, resource constraints significantly limit engagement. Women’s organisations face chronic underfunding and limited access to flexible financial support (Mayen, 2013). 

Ultimately, while frameworks such as UNSCR 1325 and the R-ARCSS provide important entry points, greater emphasis must be placed on implementation. Strengthening the link between grassroots peacebuilding and formal processes is key, ensuring that women’s mediation work informs national negotiations. At the same time, investment in long-term capacity-building, access to resources, and economic empowerment is essential. More broadly, challenging restrictive gender norms and strengthening monitoring and accountability mechanisms are necessary to guarantee that commitments are realised in practice (McCallum , Cohen and Awate, 2023). Inclusion is more than just increasing numbers or creating quotas; it is about ensuring that women’s contributions are recognised, supported, and able to shape peace processes in an ongoing and meaningful way. 

The Community of Sant’Egidio

Religious Actors in Peace Processes

Religious institutions are widely recognised in peacebuilding literature as influential non-state actors whose authority derives from moral credibility and deep social embeddedness rather than formal political power (Smock, 2001). In fragile and conflict-affected contexts such as South Sudan, they are among the most trusted social institutions and are often able to operate across conflict lines and sustain local-level mediation where state authority is weak or absent (Nadziak, 2025). However, their influence typically diminishes in formal peace negotiations, which remain dominated by armed and political elites, creating a persistent gap between grassroots engagement and national-level settlements. The Community of Sant’Egidio, a Rome-based Catholic lay movement operating as a transnational Track II mediator, illustrates how faith-based actors attempt to bridge this divide through informal diplomatic engagement. Nevertheless, while Sant’Egidio engages excluded actors across levels of the peace process, its impact remains constrained by the dominance of elite-driven negotiation structures in South Sudan.  

Community of Sant’Egidio

Founded in 1968 and today active in more than 70 countries, the Community of Sant’Egidio derives its influence from the moral legitimacy, perceived neutrality, and the trust accorded to faith-based peace actors more broadly (Smock, 2001). However, unlike locally embedded religious institutions in South Sudan, it operates independently of both state authority and formal ecclesiastical hierarchy as a non-governmental faith based-actor that combines religious inspiration with humanitarian assistance as well as Track II diplomacy – informal peace mediation conducted outside formal state negotiation channels (Bartoli, 2021).  

Sant’Egidio’s facilitation of the 1992 Rome General Peace Accords in Mozambique initially established its credibility as an international mediator, and it has since applied a similar approach across multiple conflicts in Africa, the Middle East, and beyond (Smock, 2001). This approach is focused on sustained relationship-building, developed through low-visibility diplomacy and long-term engagement with actors across fragmented and inaccessible conflict environments, particularly those excluded from formal negotiations (Bartoli, 2021; Nadziak, 2025). Taken together, Sant’Egidio has been able to remain active in protracted conflicts where official processes are stalled or highly polarised, functioning as a bridging mediator between grassroots religious legitimacy and elite-level negotiation (Burgess and Burgess, 2010). 

Role in South Sudan

In South Sudan, Sant’Egidio occupies a semi-central position within a fragmented peace architecture characterised by overlapping formal and informal negotiation tracks. It is not part of IGAD-, AU-, or UN-led frameworks, but engages non-signatory and marginalised opposition groups excluded from or only partially integrated into the Revitalised Peace Agreement (R-ARCSS) framework. 

Its engagement began with the Rome Declaration process in 2020, which established initial dialogue between the transitional government and opposition groups non-signatory to the R-ARCSS. The talks yielded a declaration reaffirming commitments to the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (Onyalla, 2020; United Nations, 2020). However, rather than a one-off agreement, the initiative resulted in a sustained mediation track through which Sant’Egidio facilitated continued dialogue and engagement over time.  

Subsequent Rome-based follow-ups, alongside Sant’Egidio’s more recent co-mediation role in the Tumaini (“Hope”) Initiative in Nairobi (2023-present), have extended the actor’s approach beyond ceasefire maintenance into broader transitional discussions addressing issues such as security arrangements and governance reform and accountability (Sant’Egidio, 2021; Khadiagala and Wahiu, 2025, pp. 44-45). Across these processes, Sant’Egidio has acted as a continuous convening actor, maintaining communication between fragmented opposition groups and linking them to the wider peace effort (PAX, 2021; United Nations, 2021; Bartoli, 2021). 

Community of Sant’Egidio in MEND

In the MEND dataset, the Community of Sant’Egidio appears as a Track II facilitative actor engaged in informal and parallel mediation, particularly in relation to the Rome Declaration process and subsequent engagements with non-signatory groups. Its inclusion highlights the role of non-state mediators in sustaining dialogue beyond formal negotiation frameworks and engaging excluded opposition factions. However, Sant’Egidio’s positioning also reinforces a broader pattern evident in the dataset: while such actors enable continued communication, they remain largely peripheral to formal decision-making structures dominated by state and regional organisations (MEND, 2025). 

Challenges

Sant’Egidio’s mediation is constrained by structural limitations inherent to Track II diplomacy. As a non-state actor operating outside formal negotiation frameworks led by IGAD, the African Union, and the United Nations, it lacks enforcement capacity, meaning outcomes depend on voluntary compliance by conflict parties and regional actors (Nadziak, 2025; Bartoli, 2021). This institutional positioning constrains its ability to translate dialogue into formal agreements or implementation outcomes. 

A further constraint lies in the fragmentation of opposition politics in South Sudan. While mediation processes are inherently designed to manage divided actors, in this case fragmentation is particularly acute: armed and political groups are internally split and organisationally fluid, meaning that participation in negotiations rarely corresponds to unified or hierarchically controlled constituencies. As a result, agreements struggle to bind wider networks, contributing to partial and uneven implementation. This structural condition is reflected in the positioning of the Community of Sant’Egidio, which has primarily engaged non-signatory and marginalised opposition factions operating outside or at the periphery of the R-ARCSS framework. 

What This Reveals about the Peace Process

Taken together, Sant’Egidio’s role and institutional positioning highlight a structural separation between inclusion and decision-making within South Sudan’s peace process. It is revealed to be a hierarchically structured and selectively inclusive system in which formal authority is concentrated within state actors as well as regional and international IGAD-, African Union-, and United Nations-led frameworks, while non-state mediators operate in parallel but without access to mechanisms of formal authorisation and implementation. Sant’Egidio’s partial exclusion thereby illustrates how formal peace processes are primarily organised around state sovereignty and regional diplomatic authority, rather than moral legitimacy or relational access. 

As a result, the central constraint on the peace process lies not only in fragmentation between mediation tracks, but in the institutional organisation of peace authority itself. This limits the translation of expanded participation into binding political outcomes. The outcome is a peace architecture that is broad in participation but weak in consolidation, where multiple mediation channels coexist without converging into a single authoritative framework. 

Looking Forward

Sant’Egidio is likely to remain an important intermediary in South Sudan due to its ability to sustain dialogue across fragmented networks. However, its effectiveness depends on stronger coordination with both bilateral state-led mediators and regional and international institutions, namely IGAD, the AU, and the UN. Without this, its role risks reinforcing parallel mediation structures rather than contributing to consolidation. More broadly, its experience illustrates that while non-state mediators are essential in fragmented conflicts, peace ultimately depends on translating dialogue into coordinated political authority. 

National Salvation Front

Introduction

The National Salvation Front (NAS) is an example of a non-signatory group in South Sudan largely resisting the most popular peace initiatives so far. Their leader, Lieutenant General Thomas Cirrilo has criticized Tumaini and R-ARCSS. NAS enjoys popularity in central Equatoria state despite reports of abuses against citizenry, but has no presence outside Equatoria. The majority of the NAS, including Cirrilo, are from the Bari people in Equatoria, leading to accusations from other parties that the NAS is simply a Bari militia despite claims otherwise by NAS. The NAS positions itself as fighting against the corruption of the powerful in Juba, pledging to “restore law and order, the respect for human rights and dignity without regard to age, gender, ethnic origin, religion, and believes in the rightful path of national co-existence, embracing the ideals of free sovereign, democratically governed nations.” It should be noted that the fight for federalism and the end of tribalism also benefits Equatoria. Cirrilo has made speeches about how the NAS defends Equatorian interests and rights (Cirrilo 2023). 

Rejection of R-ARCSS

NAS refused to sign the 2018 R-ARCSS despite the largest belligerents in South Sudan signing on. Cirrilo has highlighted how the R-ARCSS has simply kept Salva Kiir as president, while opposition leaders like Riek Machar are now prisoners of Kiir’s government in Juba (Sudans Post 2023). For Cirrilo, Kiir is at the heart of the corruption and ethnic division in South Sudan. Any agreement that allows Kiir to control South Sudanese oil or is able to cause ethnic divisions is unacceptable to Cirrilo. He has also criticized how the 2018 R-ARCSS was negotiated and signed in East Africa, calling for a more neutral venue like Rome.  

As many of the R-ARCSS provisions were delayed, including the drafting of a constitution and the start of elections, Cirrilo and the NAS have highlighted concerns over the effectiveness of existing peace agreements. Cirrilo’s critiques ring louder after the collapse of the R-ARCSS following the arrest of Machar and the strengthening over power of the Kiir administration.  

The Rome Peace Process and SSOMA

The NAS has sought other ways to engage in peace processes, repudiating any process based in East Africa. Instead, the NAS has been involved in the Sant’Egidio mediation efforts because Cirrilo perceives Rome as a better neutral venue (Cirrilo 2024). NAS signed the Rome Declaration with the South Sudan government in 2020, committing to a cessation of hostilities and guarantees for humanitarian organizations to be able to operate in the country (Rome Declaration 2020). However, both the government and NAS have accused the other of violating this agreement. NAS has also been active in Rome to internationalize its position as a state-building movement rather than just another rebel group seeking power or wealth (Catholic Herald 2020). Their lack of involvement in other peace processes caused NAS to have little international stature. Now they are known by peace mediators worldwide as a belligerent leading a different vision for South Sudan. By finally involving itself in peace negotiations, NAS can also legitimate its message of working towards a more peaceful South Sudan. 

Furthermore, It was during these talks that the South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOMA) was established with Cirrilo and the NAS at its head. SSOMA is a coalition of holdout groups who refuse to take part in the Tumaini peace talks in Nairobi (Radio Tamazuj 2024a; 2024b). 

NAS further outlined their requirements for a peace deal in Rome (National Salvation Front 2020). NAS wants a complete government overhaul to form a federal system, whereby there is better and less corrupt management of natural resources and territorial protection in Equatoria state (National Salvation Front 2022). NAS believes that the Kiir’s regime in Juba “lacks the political will for good and inclusive governance” (Radio Tamazuj 2023). Unlike other actors like the SPLM or SPLM-IO who have signed on to power sharing agreements, NAS claims to seek a complete overhaul of the political landscape in South Sudan, making peace difficult as any peace effort that keeps Kiir as president is already disfavorable in the eyes of the NAS. 

The Tumaini Initiative

NAS has also been a leading actor in criticizing the Tumaini Initiative. Kenya invited many leading opposition leaders, including high level representatives from SPLM and SPLM-IO to negotiate in Nairobi how to revitalize the R-ARCSS. NAS has led the SSOMA in the critique of the initiative. NAS has boycotted the peace mediation effort due to concerns over the safety of the venue and being based on the R-ARCSS (Radio Tamazuj 2024c). Furthermore, NAS and SSOMA have accused the initiative of lacking broad national consultations and prioritizing elections while avoiding structural problems in the country (National Salvation Front 2026). As long as conflict, mass displacement, and state failure persist in South Sudan, SSOMA does not believe that elections are possible. SSOMA has explicitly “emphasised that elections must be the outcome of peace – not a substitute for it” (National Salvation Front 2026). As thus, NAS is missing for 2024-25 in the MEND database, reflecting their rejection of contemporary peace mediation efforts (MEND, 2025).  

However, not all members of SSOMA went along with this dialogue. Gen. Paul Malong of the South Sudan United Front and Pagan Amum of the Real-SPLM broke away from SSOMA to join the discussions in Kenya (Riek Gaak 2025). This has severely fractured NAS’s SSOMA, leaving NAS alone in countering the Salva Kiir government (Radio Tamazuj 2025). While the peace negotiations did achieve in getting some of the opposition to meet with the government, the lack of a concrete peace resolution from the talks leaves South Sudan just more divided. Now that SSOMA is weaker, Kiir’s government is in a relatively stronger position as its opposition is less united; thus, an analysis of who chose or not to attend the Tumaini Initiative illustrates the political maneuvering done by Salva Kiir to strengthen his position. 

Conclusion

What becomes clear from this project is that peacebuilding in South Sudan is shaped not only by who is involved, but by how different actors are positioned within the process. The actor network highlights how some actors occupy more central and highly connected positions, while others, despite being active, remain less visible within decision-making spaces. The three cases reflect this in different ways: women’s groups illustrate the gap between participation and influence, Sant’Egidio highlights how dialogue can be sustained outside formal processes but with limited impact on outcomes, and NAS shows how exclusion and disagreement continue to fragment peace efforts. What emerges is a peace process that is active but fragmented: broad in participation, yet uneven in influence, and still struggling to translate dialogue into lasting change. 

South Sudan Visualisation

Visualisation User Guide

This is a visualisation of the third parties active in South Sudan. Nodes represent third party actors, and connections represent the actors working together on mediation events. Larger and darker nodes indicate third parties that have collaborated more often, and thicker connections indicate that there are more collaborations between the two nodes they are connecting. The degree of a node is the number of connections coming in and out, and the strength of a connection refers to how thick it is. Kumu may display strength as metrics:last, these are equivalent terms.

The filters at the bottom can be used to select subsets of the data. Click on a year to only see data from that year, and select M or MR to view mediation or mediation-related events. Mediation events are “non-coercive facilitation of communication or negotiation between disputing parties to help them reach a mutually acceptable agreement or resolution to their conflict by an external third-party. Mediation always involves at least two (local) conflict stakeholders, at least one of them needing to be a belligerent“. Mediation-related events are “non-coercive measures to facilitate the mediation. These measures are aimed at (1) encouraging a conflict party or parties to come to/continue with the negotiation; (2) expanding the range of actors directly or indirectly included in the mediation; (3) coordinating among third-parties; (4) monitoring and advising on implementation as part of formal follow-up mechanisms“. By default, all values are shown – if all filter values are selected, or if no filter values are selected, all datapoints are shown.

References

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Akuocpiir, M.M. (2024) A Discursive Article Concerning Peace Prospects & Elections in South Sudan: Questions on the Effectiveness of Tumaini Peace Initiative or Agreement in Kenya & RTGONU in South Sudan, South Sudan National Revolutionary Movement (SSNRM). Available at: https://ssnrm.wordpress.com/2024/09/14/a-discursive-article-concerning-peace-prospects-elections-in-south-sudan-questions-on-the-effectiveness-of-tumaini-peace-initiative-or-agreement-in-kenya-rtgonu-in-south-sudan/ (Accessed: 17 April 2026).  

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Kezie-Nwoha, H. and Were, J. (2018). Women’s informal peace efforts: Grassroots activism in South Sudan. CMI Brief. Available at: https://www.cmi.no/publications/6700-womens-informal-peace-efforts (Accessed: 7 April 2026). 

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Manyang, Y. (2025) Opinion| Tumaini Initiative: A promising peace or an empty gesture?, Radio Tamazuj. Available at: https://www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/opinion-tumaini-initiative-a-promising-peace-or-an-empty-gesture (Accessed: 17 April 2026).  

Mandil N., and Winter J. (2025). ‘South Sudan vice-president charged with murder and treason.’ BBC. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c07vkln2ezro 

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McCallum , J., Cohen, C. and Awate, L. (2023). Breaking barriers: empowering women in peace mediation for lasting peace in South Sudan. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Available at: https://assets.ctfassets.net/jzxyrkiixcim/6TtxetkfiwjMp0EQKQ1wzg/7eee3d55919d5acbe1106dce31b102c3/BREAKING_BARRIERS.pdf. 

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